An Approach to Post Mortem Diagnosability Analysis for Interacting Finite State Systems  by Lawesson, Dan et al.
An Approach to Post Mortem Diagnosability
Analysis for Interacting Finite State Systems
Dan Lawesson, Ulf Nilsson
Dept. of Computer & Information Science
Linko¨ping University
SE-581 83 Linko¨ping, SWEDEN
{danla,ulfni}@ida.liu.se
Inger Klein
Dept. of Electrical Engineering
Linko¨ping University
SE-581 83 Linko¨ping, SWEDEN
inger@isy.liu.se
Abstract
We present a model based approach to diagnosability analysis for interacting ﬁnite state systems
where fault isolation is deferred until the system comes to a standstill. Local abstractions of the
system model are used to alleviate the state space explosion. Pairs of closely coupled automata
are merged and replaced by a single automaton with an equivalently behavior as seen from the
rest of the system; interaction between the merged automata is internalized and the new equiva-
lent automaton is subsequently abstracted from internal behavior irrelevant to fault isolation. In
moderately concurrent systems these steps can often be iterated until the system consists of a sin-
gle automaton providing a compact encoding of all possible fault scenarios of the original model.
We illustrate how the resulting abstraction can be used as a basis for post mortem diagnosability
analysis.
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1 Introduction
We propose a model-based approach to diagnosability analysis in software
based control systems, where systems are modeled by means of discrete event
systems [3]; more precisely interacting ﬁnite state machines, FSM:s. The faults
considered are hardware faults, but we assume that they are either modeled
explicitly in the same framework as the software or that malfunctioning hard-
ware is reﬂected in failing software services. Our work is motivated by a
commercial control system for industrial robots developed by ABB Automa-
tion Technologies. The software has an object oriented architecture which
makes fault isolation especially hard, since object orientation relies heavily on
encapsulation. This implies that software components have little knowledge
about the global state of the system, and in particular whether error reporting
is going on elsewhere. This often leads to fault propagation and excessive error
reporting at system failures. Moreover, the alarms typically reﬂect the soft-
ware architecture providing little assistance to an operator. The aim therefore
is to identify the root cause(s).
Because of the safety-critical nature of the application, fault isolation, in
case of system failure, can take place only after the system comes to a stand-
still. Results from on-line diagnosability (see e.g. [12,11,6]) are therefore not
(directly) applicable. The software has a relatively small number of concurrent
threads, but the fact that it is concurrent, together with the fact that safety-
critical actions may have to be taken before error reporting can take place,
means that the order among error messages in the log cannot be trusted.
In this paper we describe a method for abstraction of the system model.
We also illustrate how the abstraction can be used to study the diagnosability
of the system. The approach amounts to abstracting the system description
into a single acyclic FSM that is equivalent to the original system from the
fault isolation perspective. The resulting FSM essentially is a table coupling
all possible observations—i.e. error messages—with the critical event(s) that
might have caused them.
The idea is to replace pairs of components (FSM:s) by a new component
which behaves as the pair—both in terms of interaction with the context and
from the fault isolation perspective—but where all other irrelevant behavior
is discarded. The merging is iterated until the system consists of a single
component which is identical to the original system from the fault isolation
perspective. As opposed to e.g. Benveniste et al. [2] we have a system with rel-
atively few threads of execution, and with a stable and rather sparse topology.
However, state space explosion is an issue and the approach is worst-case ex-
ponential in the number of components. Still in practice the algorithm is often
feasible if the selection of pairs is done carefully as illustrated in a companion
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paper [9].
In the next section we describe the modeling framework including the
behavioral model of the software control system. In Section 3 we describe the
local abstractions and the algorithm which constitutes the core of the method,
and in Section 4 we show how the result of the abstractions can be used to
analyze the diagnostic properties of the system. A summary is provided in
Section 5 together with related work.
2 The Modeling Framework
In this section we outline the modeling framework, where system components
are modeled by interacting ﬁnite state machines and behavior is deﬁned as
inﬁnite words of global system states.
2.1 Components
Our system model will be a ﬁnite set of interacting components, modeled by
ﬁnite state machines. A component may be a software component (object) or
a piece of hardware. The system model is based on an asynchronous inter-
leaving semantics, while synchronization among pairs of components relies on
handshaking in the style of CSP [5] or CCS [10].
Deﬁnition 2.1 A basic component c is a tuple (Σ, Q,R, q0) where Σ is a ﬁnite
set of events, Q a ﬁnite set of states, R ⊆ Q×Σ×Q a transition relation and
q0 ∈ Q an initial state.
The set Σ of events is partitioned into disjoint categories of sending events
Σsnd , receiving events Σrec and internal events Σint . The internal events are
further partitioned into logged events Σlog , critical events Σcrit and epsilon
events Σ. Only logging events are observable e.g. by an operator. By con-
vention sending events are denoted e!, receiving events e?, logged events e:log,
critical events e:crit and epsilon events  (but in examples we prefer to use
mnemonic names). Given an event name e we refer to e! and e? as comple-
mentary events.
If a component contains a transition (a, e, b) ∈ R, we usually denote this
by a e−−− b. To distinguish between transitions that must eventually take
place if enabled long enough, and transitions that do not have to take place
even if enabled forever, we partition the transitions into optional (the latter
type) and non-optional ones (the former type). To emphasize that a tran-
sition is optional we write a
e
−−− b while a non-optional transition is written
a
e
−−− b. Optional transitions are typically used to model uncontrollable be-
havior; e.g. transitions involving critical events.
D. Lawesson et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 149 (2006) 139–153 141
Fig. 1. Simpliﬁed model of robot control system, with motion control, interpolator, servo, commu-
nication bus, server and client
A state a is said to be transient if there is another state b = a and an
internal event e such that a e−−− b; i.e. if there is an internal non-optional
transition to another state.
Figure 1 depicts six components of a schematic and much simpliﬁed robot
control system: Motion control (MOC) repeatedly sends positions to an inter-
polator (IPOL) but may also receive notice that IPOL in non-operational. The
interpolator receives positions and computes a segment which is forwarded to
the servo, but it may also detect an invalid segment/position and fail critically;
after which it sends down-messages to MOC. After sending a segment IPOL
waits for a ready- or fail-message from the servo. In the latter case, IPOL also
sends down-messages to MOC. Upon receiving a segment the servo may crash
silently, or forward data to the robot via the bus, or it may receive a time-out
(to) from the bus in which case it sends a fail-message to IPOL. If the data
is successfully forwarded the servo receives an acknowledgment and sends a
ready-message to IPOL. The bus simply receives data and sends acknowledg-
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Fig. 2. Extended version of interpolator (IPOL)
ments. It may also go down while waiting for data. The system also contains
a generic server that communicates via the bus and a client communicating
with the server. Leaving all functionality aside a client may fail if the server
fails to respond to a client request.
To facilitate reasoning about the history of a state we instrument basic
component states with a record of critical and logged events previously en-
countered.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let c = (Σ, Q,R, q0) be a basic component. An extended
state, henceforth simply called a state, s, is a pair (q, E) where q ∈ Q and E
is a set of pairs c:e where e ∈ Σcrit ∪ Σlog .
Figure 2 depicts the extended version of the basic component IPOL in
Figure 1. The basic state isDown is now replaced by two extended states.
Given a state s of the form (q, E) we let seen(s) denote E. Note that E is a
set and does not account of order and multiplicity. This is in part motivated
by the fact that the order among messages in the log cannot be trusted; but
it is also for complexity reasons. Even if E is a set it may still result in an
exponential blow-up in the size of a component; however, in practice there are
few critical and logged event in a basic component. Note also that seen(s)
should not be interpreted as the observable part of the state (as seen e.g. by
an operator)—only logging events are observable while e.g. critical events are
always unobservable.
The state (q0, ∅) is called the initial (extended) state and is denoted init(c).
We also lift the transition relation of a basic component from basic states Q





−−− (q2, E ∪ {c:e}) if e ∈ Σ
log ∪ Σcrit ,
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• (q1, E)
e
−−− (q2, E) otherwise.
Unless otherwise stated we implicitly mean extended components when refer-
ring to components below.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let (Σ, S, R, s0) be a component. We say that a state si ∈ S




−−− . . .
ei
−−− si.
States that are not locally reachable can be discarded without aﬀecting
the behavior of a component and in practice we will not consider such states
as part of the component.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let c be a component. By |c|, the size of c, we denote the
cardinality of the set of locally reachable states.
2.2 System descriptions and interaction
We next consider interaction among sets of components.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A system description SD is a ﬁnite set of components.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let SD = {c1, . . . , cn} be a system description where ci =
(Σi, Si, Ri, s
0
i ), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By a global state σ we mean a mapping
from SD to component states such that σ(ci) ∈ Si, for each ci ∈ SD .
Given a component ci with s ∈ Si we write σ[ci →s] for the global state




s if c = ci,
σ(c) otherwise.
Deﬁnition 2.7 By the initial global state of SD , denoted init(SD), we
mean the global state σ such that σ(ci) = s
0
i , for each i.
Components change state in an interleaving fashion. If σ is a state, σ(ci)
e
−−− s
and e is an internal event of ci, then
σ ⇒ σ[ci →s].
The global state may also change due to synchronization between exactly
two components with complementary events: if σ(ci)
e!
−−− s1 and σ(cj)
e?
−−− s2
(where i = j) then
σ ⇒ σ[ci →s1, cj →s2].
To make the global transition relation total we also permit a stuttering tran-
sition
σ ⇒ σ.
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2.3 System behavior
System behavior is deﬁned as inﬁnite words of global states, where the ﬁrst
state is init(SD) and subsequent states obey the global transition relation ⇒
above.
Deﬁnition 2.8 By a run of a system description SD we mean an inﬁnite
word of global states σ0σ1σ2 . . . such that σ0 = init(SD) and σi ⇒ σi+1 for
all i ≥ 0.
We write runs(SD) for the set of all runs of a system description SD .
However, some runs are implausible in the sense that there may be non-
optional transitions which are enabled indeﬁnitely but never take place. In
particular, we do not want the stuttering transition to be applied forever if
some component can make a move. We adopt a weak form of fairness to
discard such runs.
Deﬁnition 2.9 We say that a run σ0σ1σ2 . . . is fair if there is no inﬁnite suﬃx
of states where some component is able to perform a non-optional transition
without eventually doing so.
Let R be a set of runs. By fair(R) we denote the set of all fair runs of R.
In each fair run σ0σ1σ2 . . . we are interested in the ﬁrst critical event and
the set of all critical and logged events of the run. The latter amounts to
seen(σi) for some suﬃciently large i.
Deﬁnition 2.10 Let r = σ0σ1σ2 . . . be a run. By abs(r) we denote the pair
(e, S) where e is the ﬁrst critical event of r and S is the set of all critical and
logged events in r. We refer to e as the root cause.
This abstraction of a run extends naturally to sets of runs R. By allowing
only a ﬁnite set of events, the abstraction of any run, and even inﬁnite sets of
runs, has a ﬁnite abstraction.
abs(R) =
⋃
{abs(r) | r ∈ R}.




The aim of our approach is to automatically construct a new abstract system
description which is less detailed than the initial one, but still has the same
diagnostic abstraction.
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Deﬁnition 3.1 We say that two system descriptions SD1 and SD2 are di-
agnosis equivalent (written SD1  SD2) iﬀ they have the same diagnostic
abstraction, i.e. if diabs(SD1) = diabs(SD2).
We iteratively replace a set C of components by a single component c,
which not only has the same diagnostic abstraction as C , but has the same
observational behavior to the rest of the system description. Henceforth, called
a context.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let C ⊆ SD . The set SD \ C is called the context of C .
3.1 Cartesian product
We propose to take a pair of components ci, cj ∈ SD and replace them by a
new component ci⊗ cj which is diagnosis equivalent to {ci, cj} in any context.
The resulting new system description is diagnosis equivalent to SD and has
one component less. We then iterate the pairwise merging until the system
description consists of a single component; which of course is also diagnosis
equivalent to SD .
The basic idea behind the pairwise replacement is simple; we replace ci
and cj by a component where each state corresponds to being simultaneously
in exactly one state of ci and one state of cj.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let s1 = (q1, E1) and s2 = (q2, E2) be states. Then s1⊗ s2 =
((q1, q2), E1 ∪ E2).
The notion of product of states is lifted to sets S1, S2 of states: S1 ⊗ S2 =
{s1 ⊗ s2 | s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2}.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Let c1 = (Σ1, S1, R1, s
1
0) and c2 = (Σ2, S2, R2, s
2
0) be compo-
nents. The Cartesian product c1⊗ c2 of c1 and c2 is a component (Σ, S, R, s0)
where
• Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2,
• S = S1 ⊗ S2,





• R ⊆ S × Σ× S is the smallest relation such that
· s⊗ t e−−− s′ ⊗ t if s e−−− s′ and t ∈ S2,
· s⊗ t e−−− s⊗ t′ if s ∈ S1 and t
e
−−− t′,
· s⊗ t −−− s′ ⊗ t′ if s e1−−− s′ and t e2−−− t′ and e1, e2 are complementary.
The basic idea is that the new transition is optional if any of the involved
transitions is optional. However, the exact deﬁnition is more complicated and
cannot be covered here for lack of space. See [7] for details.
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Note that |ci ⊗ cj | = |ci| · |cj |. That is, the number of states is not reduced.
However, it is often possible to remove a number of states and transitions.
It particular, the following two simpliﬁcations can always be applied to any
component in a context:
• a transition with a sending or receiving event where the context does not
contain the complementary event cannot take place and all such transitions
can be removed,
• states that are not locally reachable can be removed (as can all transitions
that originate in unreachable states).
The aim is to ﬁnd pairs of components where the above simpliﬁcations can
be applied. Moreover, it is often possible to remove some internal events of
a component without aﬀecting the observational behavior; in our case the
diagnostic abstraction. We present two such abstractions—forced epsilon and
log removal and internal cycle merging.
3.2 Forced epsilon and log removal
Assume that an object has a state s from which there is only one epsilon/logged-
transition t which is non-optional. Any run reaching s must eventually involve
also t. Then s can be discarded, and all in-going transitions moved to the des-
tination state of t without changing the model of the system in which the
object is located. Logged events and critical events are recorded in the his-
tory component of the local states, and thus transitions need not be kept to
maintain observational equivalence.
3.3 Internal cycle merging
Assume that there is a cycle of internal transitions in an object. The states
on this cycle can all be merged into a single state s without changing the
model of the system the object belongs to. In order to model the case where
some transitions can be refused on the cycle, i.e. transitions that are enabled
only in a subset of the states of the cycle, the transitions from s are labeled
to indicate whether they are optional or not. An optional transition from s
corresponds to a transition enabled only in a strict subset of the states on the
cycle.
3.4 Basic algorithm
The aim is to construct a single component which is diagnosis equivalent to
the initial system description SD . In principle this is easy: given SD =
{c1, . . . , cn} we may construct a new component with states S1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Sn,
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Algorithm 1 Basic abstraction scheme
Input: A set of components SD
Output: A single component, diagnosis equivalent to SD
1: Simplify and abstract all c ∈ SD
2: while there is a pair of suitable components do
3: Replace the pair by its product
4: Simplify and abstract the new component
5: end while
6: Merge all remaining components
7: Simplify and abstract the resulting component
8: Return the component
whose transitions simulate those of SD . However, this leads to a state-space
explosion in all interesting cases. Instead we advocate a local approach where
we take the product of two components and then discard states and tran-
sitions which are irrelevant for fault isolation; we then iterate this until the
system description consists of a single component (or until it is feasible to com-
pute the product of all remaining components). While this approach is also
computationally infeasible in the general case (exponential in the number of
components), it appears to perform well in practice under suitable restrictions.
In [9] we demonstrate that with a stable and sparse system topology with only
a restricted number of concurrent threads, non-trivial system descriptions can
often be abstracted into a single component; provided that components are
merged in an appropriate order (see [9] or [7] for details).
The basic structure of the abstraction algorithm is outlined in Algorithm
1. The result of applying the algorithm to the system i Figure 1 (with two
clients) is shown in Figure 3. Such an FSM will always be a rooted graph
containing only internal events (since the context is empty), and because of
internal cycle merging the graph must be acyclic.
Theorem 3.5 If a system description SD is abstracted into a single compo-
nent c where no further internal cycle merging is possible, then c is an acyclic
directed graph containing only internal events.
All possible complete logs can be found in the non-transient states of the
graph (states labeled s-20, s-21, s-22, s-24, s-26 and s-33 in our example), and
the root cause(s) of a log can be easily found traversing the graph backwards.
The approach has been implemented, see [8] for an early account. Recent
experimental results (see [9] or [7]) using synthetic examples suggest that the
approach copes with nontrivial examples (> 100 000 reachable states) provided
that the system has a sparse topology with a small number of concurrent
threads of execution ( ≤ 5), and assuming that the components are abstracted
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Fig. 3. Abstraction of the system in Figure 1 with two clients
in the appropriate order. The experiments also indicate that the number of
states of the ﬁnal automaton on average is only a few percent of the number
of reachable states in the original system and that this ﬁgure is decreasing as
the number of reachable states increases. For systems with 100 000 reachable
states the abstraction has less than 1 000 states on average.
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4 Root Cause Diagnosability Analysis
The result of Algorithm 1 is useful not only to diagnose a speciﬁc fault
scenario—more generally it also allows us to statically analyze the diagnos-
ability of the system. Diagnosability in the context of discrete event systems
usually means the ability to detect that all faults (or fault types) have occurred
with bounded delay (see e.g. [6,11,12]). Such a notion of diagnosability is use-
ful in an on-line setting, but it does not solve our speciﬁc problem—namely,
to identify, on the basis of the logged events, the root cause(s) among several
faults; most of which are only consequences of the root cause(s). Other no-
tions of diagnosability, such as [4], exist but do not seem to provide adequate
means to isolate root cause(s) in our sense.
Let R(L ) denote the set of all fair runs of SD converging to the log L .
We say that a critical event e is present in L , if all runs in R(L ) contain
the event e. We say that a critical event e is an enabled root in L , if there
is a run in R(L ) with e as the ﬁrst critical event, and that the event e is a
proven root in L , if e is the one and only enabled root in L .
It is clearly desirable to be able to identify a proven root for each possi-
ble log. However, in our experience it is impossible in most models, unless
additional assumptions are made (such as the single fault assumption). We
therefore introduce the following, weaker notion: We say that e is a strong
root candidate in L if it is both present in L and an enabled root in L . A
strong root candidate is a critical event that, based upon the observations, (1)
must have happened and (2) does not necessarily follow other critical events.
We say that L is strongly diagnosable if it has a proven root, and that SD
is strongly diagnosable if all possible logs of SD are strongly diagnosable.
We say that L is weakly diagnosable if it has at least one strong root
candidate, and that SD is weakly diagnosable if every possible log of SD
is weakly diagnosable. Since proven roots are also strong root candidates,
strong diagnosability implies weak diagnosability. Diagnosability in the weak
sense typically arises in two situations: when there are multiple faults that
may cause each other, and when there are multiple non-causal faults, as seen
below.
Since Algorithm 1 preserves the diagnostic abstraction we may use it to
analyze the diagnostic properties of SD . Consider Figure 3 again. The non-
transient states of the component in Figure 3 are s-20, s-21, s-22, s-24, s-26
and s-33. These are the states that represent completed runs of the original
system; i.e. fair runs where nothing new (in terms of logging or critical events)
has to happen. These are the states that encode the possible logs, and the
critical events that might have taken place. The following are the possible
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logs of our example
L1 : ∅
L2 : {moc:log:down}
L3 : {client1:log:badserver, client2:log:badserver}
L4 : {moc:log:down, client1:log:badserver, client2:log:badserver}.
States s-22 and s-24 represent runs that result in no logging at all, i.e. the log
L1. State s-33 is the only state that represents runs resulting in the log L2.
States s-20 and s-26 represent runs reporting L4, while state s-21 represents
runs where only L3 is reported.
First consider state s-33: This state represents runs reporting L2. Since
there is no other non-transient state with the corresponding log, and since s-33
has a unique root cause we may conclude that the log L2 uniquely determines
the root cause—in our case that IPOL failed to compute a segment. In our
terminology this is a proven root in L2. Hence, L2 is strongly diagnosable.
However, it is the only log which is strongly diagnosable in our example.
States s-20 and s-26 both correspond to the log L4. All corresponding runs
are hence observationally indistinguishable. However, runs ending in state s-
20 contain only one critical event—the failure of the bus—while runs ending in
s-26 contain two critical events both of which can be the root cause; either the
bus failed followed by the failure of IPOL or vice versa. Hence if we observe
L4 we cannot uniquely pinpoint the root cause. We know that the bus must
have failed although not necessarily ﬁrst. Hence, crit.down is a strong root
candidate of L4—a critical event which is known to have occurred and may
be the root cause. In the absence of a proven root this may be considered a
reasonable ﬁrst choice when trying to recover from the failure, but we cannot
exclude IPOL as the actual root cause. In our previous work on fault isolation
the pragmatic choice has been to look for strong root candidates in the absence
of proven roots, and before presenting the user with the set of all possible root
causes, see [8].
The model can be improved somewhat in the case of L4. Note that only
state s-26 has been preceded by the failure of IPOL. Hence if we add a logging
event to IPOL after failing but before starting sending down-messages there
will be an additional error message in the run iﬀ IPOL fails. The new message
will then appear in s-26 but not in s-20 and we can distinguish between the
two cases; we will then have a proven root in s-20, but will still have two
possible root causes (and strong root candidates) in s-26.
State s-21 represents the log L3. Again there are two possible roots for
this log—either the bus went down, or the servo failed, or both. In fact, in
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this case the failures are non-causal—the failure of the servo does not have to
result in the failure of bus (as witnessed by state s-24) and the failure of the
bus does not have to result in the failure of the servo (as witnessed e.g. by
state s-20). Hence in this case we have two (independent) root causes, and two
strong root candidates. This illustrates the need for strong root candidates in
the absence of proven roots.
Finally consider the states labeled s-22 and s-24. They represent runs
resulting in no observables at all, i.e. L1. However, only state s-22 represents
fault-free runs, while state s-24 represents runs where the servo has failed
critically. To remedy the situation we must ensure that the failure of the servo
eventually leads to a logging event. If the FSM servo is realized in software
this is just a matter of making sure that the servo issues some (new) error
message before going down; otherwise the message may have to be introduced
in some other component communicating directly or indirectly with the failing
component.
5 Conclusions
We have shown how local abstractions under appropriate restrictions can be
used to derive a representation of fault behavior of a discrete event system.
The approach amounts to iteratively replacing pairs of automata by a new
automaton which behaves as the original pair when it comes to fault behavior
and interaction with the rest of the system but where local interaction and
internal behavior is discarded. While computationally infeasible in the general
case the method handles system descriptions of considerable size assuming that
the system has a sparse topology and a small number of concurrent threads of
execution—properties typically possessed by centralized control systems, but
typically not by distributed systems, such as telecommunication networks [2].
In contrast to [12,11,6] we are not relying on on-line diagnosis but restrict
attention to systems where fault isolation takes place after the system comes to
a standstill; i.e. when error reporting stops (or to be more precise, when no new
error messages are reported). We have illustrated how the abstraction can be
used to statically determine diagnostic properties of systems; in particular to
assist in determining the root cause(s) when the system comes to a standstill.
Although solving completely diﬀerent problems our approach based on local
composition/abstraction is similar in spirit e.g. to that of Baroni et al. [1],
and in particular Pencole´ [11], who studies on-line diagnosis in a distributed
setting. While we are not dealing with a distributed system we also consider
sets of interacting automata, and by considering encapsulated components
our problem shares several characteristics with distributed systems; albeit
D. Lawesson et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 149 (2006) 139–153152
heterogeneous and moderately concurrent ones. Also in contrast to e.g. [11]
and [12] we do not consider order and multiplicity of observable events, but
rather abstract them into sets. As a consequence we support potentially more
aggressive abstraction strategies, but may lose in diagnostic power.
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